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Abstract
Recent findings in economic theory show that cooperation (settlement) be-
tween two identical players with conflicting interests in a valuable and con-
testable resource always Pareto dominates violent dispute (war), given that
cooperation is presented using a symmetric bargaining norm. Necessary con-
ditions for settlement to arise are the destructibility of war, and the costless
and exogenous enforcement of any agreement made by the two players. We
show that endogenous enforcement of the agreements alters the incentives of
the players to bargain. This causes a shift in the Pareto frontier so that -
under certain conditions - war Pareto dominates settlement.
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Even peace may be purchased at too high a price.
. — Benjamin Franklin
1 Introduction
Since the seminal contributions of Nash (1950) and Schelling (1956) bargaining has
become a major tool in economics to explain the phenomena of cooperation between
agents with conflicting interests. Examples include labor and trade negotiations,1
as well as peace negotiations.2 Recently, economic theory began to illuminate the
reason for the violent and non-violent resolution of territorial disputes using different
bargaining norms in models of contests, i.e. in models in which agents make irre-
versible investment in arms in order to influence the probability of winning (Garfinkel
and Skaperdas (2000), Anbarci et al. (2002), Cai (2003), Skaperdas (2006), McBride
and Skaperdas (2006) and Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007)), most of them using the
classical guns-versus-butter tradeoff of nations.3
Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000) and Skaperdas (2006) have shown that, in a one-
period game, cooperation between two identical players with conflicting interests in
a valuable and contestable resource always Pareto dominates violent dispute (war),
given that cooperation is presented using a symmetric bargaining norm. The reason
for this finding is the fact that violent measures involve destruction of the above
resource (henceforth referred to as resource under consideration). The fact that the
investment in arms made by the agents in order to compel cooperation is equal to
(Skaperdas (2006)) or less than (Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000)) the investment in
arms made in case of war, creates a Pareto inferior outcome in case of war. Central
to this finding is the assumption that, even without third party enforcement of con-
tracts, an agreement between the two agents about the allocation of the resource
under consideration affords them perfectly secure property rights, which means that
the settlement remains uncontested. Given that in case of settlement arms are pro-
duced prior to the settlement in order to influence the negotiating position and that
arms are therefore not exhausted in case of settlement, this seems to be an awkward
assumption.
Contrary to Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000) and Skaperdas (2006) we assume that
the agreed-upon property rights are not necessarily self-enforcing. In fact, we be-
lieve that any agreement leading to a peaceful settlement affords initial claims to
property which have to be enforced by the agents using the arms initially produced
as a bargaining chip. Therefore, in the spirit of Grossman (2001), we distinguish
between the conflict about a common pool resource (war) and the conflict about a
resource to which agents have initial claims to property, obtained by mutual agree-
ment.
Any violent dispute over the resource under consideration, without former mutual
1See, for example, Crawford (1981), McDonald and Solow (1981), Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985),
and Acemoglu and Pischke (1999).
2Early examples are Morrow (1986), Powell (1987), Morrow (1987), and Downs and Rocke (1990).
3See Samuelson (1958), page 21.
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agreement on how to divide the resource, is called war (about a common pool re-
source). In the case of war, the resource under consideration is divided according
to the technology of conflict, which maps the investment in arms of either side into
a share function.4 Additionally, we assume that, unlike any non-violent partition of
the resource, war is destructive, by which we mean that war destroys a part of the
resource under consideration. It is to emphasize that arms are exhausted in case
of war. Thus, similar to Grossman (2001), any post-war allocation of the common
pool resource remains uncontested, i.e. war creates effective property rights.
If both agents decide to bargain over the common pool resource and find an agree-
ment, then each one obtains initial claims to a part of the resource under consid-
eration through the agreement. In other words, any agreement on the resource
allocation turns a former common pool resource into a commodity to which agents
have initial claims to property. Unlike Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000) and Skaper-
das (2006), we are emphasizing that these are initial claims, since any agreement
met through a bargaining procedure is basically not more than a mutual deselecting
of the payoffs in case of a disagreement (here: payoffs in case of war).5 However, as
will become apparent, the bargaining procedure involves positive investment in arms
in order to influence the disagreement point. Therefore, in contrast to war, arms
are not exhausted in the bargaining procedure since they are produced in order to
compel cooperation (an agreement). This is the reason why settlement, unlike war,
does not necessarily create effective property rights. Effective property rights only
emerge if the arms, produced in order to compel cooperation, are not exhausted in
order to contest the initial claims afforded by the agreement.6
To display the potential violent use of arms after settlement, we make use of the
Grossman modification of the TCSF which discriminates between the offensive use
of arms in order to contest the initial claims of others (appropriation) on the one
hand, and the use of arms for defensive fortification (defense) on the other.7 Con-
sequently, any agreement on the division of the resource under consideration which
remains unchallenged (uncontested settlement) is only possible in the following case:
Either side’s investment in arms that associates the bargaining procedure is exclu-
sively used to defend the initial claims to property.8 In other words: In this case,
both agents are able to deter appropriation, given the investment in arms already
made.9 This fact leads to our first question: Is uncontested settlement possible in
the shadow of arms that are associated with the bargaining procedure? The answer is
4As in Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000) and Skaperdas (2006) we use a Tullock contest success
function (TCSF) to display the technology of conflict in case of war.
5In Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000) these initial claims are perfectly secure. That implies that any
agreement about the division of the resource under consideration creates simultaneously perfectly
secure property rights, i.e. property rights that remain uncontested.
6This is what Neary (1996) calls redistribution by force.
7See Grossman and Kim (1995).
8As will become clear, given the preferences of agents and the Grossman modification of the TCSF,
arms are allways exhausted ex-post, i.e. after the settlement.
9There is still another possibility: If initial claims to property are converted into effective property
rights by an outside enforcement agency. But this raises the question why this outside enforcement
agency does not ex-ante, i.e. prior to the bargaining procedure, enforces an allocation of the
resource under consideration, which comprises zero inefficient use scarce resources.
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yes, and we will work out the exact circumstances under which self-enforcing prop-
erty rights emerge in the case of settlement.
The second question is straightforward: Since initial claims are contestable, this will
directly influence the investment in arms in the first stage. Any unit of the uncon-
testable resource, spent by an agent in order to influence the disagreement point has
a further function: It is also a means of defending the part of the resource under
consideration obtained through the bargaining procedure (domestic share), and of
appropriating the remaining part of the resource (foreign share). Thus, unlike in
Skaperdas (2006), the investment in arms in both cases (war and settlement) are
different with the latter case exhibiting a higher investment in arms.10 This will - at
least partly - offset the disadvantages of war, namely the destruction of the resource
under consideration. Consequently, the second question arises: Does settlement al-
ways Pareto dominate war? The answer is no. We will show that if war is not too
destructive, settlement always produces a lower payoff in equilibrium for both agents
than war, i.e. we will demonstrate the social benefit of war. This finding emerges,
in contrast to Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000) and Skaperdas (2006), although we
will exclusively consider a one-period game.
We will proceed in the following manner: First, we will present the basic structure
of the game, than we explicitly describe the bargaining procedure and the game
in case of war. Second, we will compare the equilibrium outcomes under war and
settlement. Third, we will conclude.
2 The modell
We assume two risk-neutral agents, indexed i = 1, 2, that have conflicting interests
in a common-pool resource with size T > 0. Both agents are in possession of an
uncontestable resource (R) from which they derive positive and constant marginal
utility. This resource can be converted into arms (ei for agent i) on a one-to-one
basis. These arms are means to determine the share of the common pool resource
each agent obtains in case of war (TWi ). In the other case (settlement), these arms
determine the negotiation position in the bargaining procedure. Moreover, these
arms, for agent i, are means to defend the initial claims obtained through the agree-
ment (the domestic share, T Si ) or to appropriate the other part of the resource (the
foreign share, T Sj with T ≡ T S1 + T S2 ).11 In either case we assume that R is large
enough so that corner solutions can be ruled out.
We will start with the bargaining procedure which we will compose as a two-stage-
game. In the first stage both agents, given the bargaining norm, simultaneously
and independently choose their investment in arms (eSi ). Moreover, since we like to
capture the role of defense as a deterrent to appropriation, we assume that in the
first stage each agent simultaneously and independently chooses the level of defense
(di) given the investment in arms (e
S
i ), with di ≤ eSi . In the second stage, each
10Hence, analogous to Garfinkel (1990), the production of arms may additionally arise from a
deterrence motive in case of settlement.
11The index j, when it appears, refers to agent other than i. To avoid needless repetition of
”i = 1, 2”, i alone will be understood to refer to each agent.
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agent decides simultaneously and independently about his investment in appropria-
tion (ai), with ai ≤ eSi − di. The part of domestic share each agent is able to defend
is as follows:
φii(di, aj, θ) =
{
1 for aj = 0,
di
di+θ aj
else.
(1)
φii(di, aj, θ) is a function of the efforts of agents, raised in order to defend (di) and
to appropriate (aj) the initial claims of agent i. The exogenous parameter θ, with
θ ∈ [0, 1], measures the effectiveness of units of R invested in arms and allocated for
appropriation of initial claims, relative to units of R invested in arms and allocated
into defending initial claims.12 For θ equal to zero challenging initial claims is
impossible. In this case, φii = 1, irrespective of the investment in appropriation,
which corresponds to the structure of the model used by Skaperdas (2006). For
θ ∈]0, 1[, appropriation is no longer precluded but is still inferior to defense in terms
of effectiveness. θ = 1 represents a challenge technology that does not discriminate
between protecting and seizing: No advantage emanates from the initial claims to
a consumption good. In order for φii to be well defined, we assume that φ
i
i is 1 if
agent j allocates no resources to appropriation.
To get a simple function of the appropriated fraction of the foreign initial claim, we
define:
φji (dj, ai, θ) = 1− φjj(dj, ai, θ) =
{
0, for ai = 0,
θai
dj+θ ai
, else.
(2)
That is, φji represents the fraction of the foreign share (T
S
j ) that agent i can suc-
cessfully appropriate.
In line with the literature on emerging property rights (see e.g. Grossman (2001)
and Kolmar (2003)), the formal design allows us to distinguish between two different
levels of property rights:
Definition 1 (The level of security of property rights)
1. A settlement is said to be uncontested if the property rights of both agents
are perfectly secure, i.e. if φ11 = φ
2
2 = 1 in equilibrium.
2. A settlement is said to be contested if the property rights of at least one agent
is insecure, i.e. if φ11 × φ22 < 1 in equilibrium.
We now turn to the second stage in the case of settlement: The decision about the
allocation of arms to appropriation.
3 Settlement - second stage
Given any allocation of the resource under consideration (T S1 and T
S
2 ), any invest-
ment in arms (eS1 and e
S
2) and any allocation of arms to defensive actions (d1 and
12It may represent formal property rights or it may reflect some technological gap between appro-
priating and defending initial claims. See Grossman (2001).
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d2) in the first stage, the utility function of both agents are
ui(a, χ,d, e
S
i , Ri, θ,T ) = φ
i
i(di, aj, θ)T
S
i + φ
j
i (dj, ai, θ)χT
S
j +Ri − eSi , (3)
with a = (a1 a2), d = (d1 d2), T =
(
T S1 T
S
2
)
, i 6= j and χ ∈ [0, 1]. Analogous to
Grossman and Kim (1995), we allow for the possibility that appropriation destroys
part of the resource, so that the appropriator gains less than the defender looses.
Thus, if the level of destruction parameter (χ) equals zero, appropriation is totally
destructive.
Given equation 3, the utility maximization problem of each agent becomes
max
ai
ui(·)
s.t. eSi ≥ ai + di,
(4)
which delivers the following Lagrangian function
Li(a, χ,d, eSi , Ri, θ,T ) = ui(·) + λi(eSi − ai − di), (5)
where λi just represents the Lagrangian multiplier which, in optimum, measures the
shadow price of a marginal increase in the investment in arms (eSi ). The shadow
price has to be distinguished from the marginal cost of production of arms. The
shadow price solely represents the marginal willingness to pay for an incremental
increase in arms in order to defend the domestic share and to appropriate the foreign
share of the resource under consideration.
Partial derivation of equation (5) with respect to ai leads to the first order condition
(FOC) in the first stage
θ dj
(θai + dj)2
χT Sj = λi, (6)
which shows that, in optimum, the marginal benefit of appropriation (left hand side
(LHS) of equation (6)) equals the shadow price of arms (right hand side (RHS) of
equation (6)). Taking into account that ai ≥ 0, equation (6) leads to the following
reaction function:
ai(χ, dj, λi, θ, Tj) =
{
a¯i for dj < d¯j ,
0 else,
(7)
with
a¯i =
√
dj Tj χ
θ λi
− dj
θ
, (8)
and
d¯j =
Tj θ χ
λi
. (9)
Without loss of generality, figure 1 represents the reaction function of agent 1 (a1(·)),
contingent on the allocation of arms to defensive actions by agent 2 (d2) for various
allocations of the resource under consideration (T S2 ). As long as d2 is sufficiently
low (d2 < d¯2) the level of appropriation of agent 1 contingent on d2 is represented
by a hump-shaped function. For d2 ≥ d¯2, the level of appropriation is zero, which
5
a1(d2, T S2 , ·)
a1(d2,T
S
2 , ·)
d2
Figure 1: a1(·) contingent on d2 for various allocations of the resource (T S2 )
shows that for the given allocation of arms to defense, appropriation is endogenously
deterred. It is worth mentioning that the higher the level of the foreign share (T S2 ),
the higher the investment in appropriation from agent 1: a1(d2, T S2 , ·) > a1(d2,T S2 , ·)
if T S2 >T
S
2 .
Given the reaction of both agents, we can now turn to display the first stage problem
of both agents.
4 Bargain - first stage
Before turning to the first stage decision of both agents regarding the investment in
arms and the allocation of arms to defensive actions, we will present the bargaining
norm. The supposed bargaining norm explicitly defines the share each agent obtains
as a result of the agreement as a function of their investment in arms:
T Si ≡ ψi(eS, γ)T, (10)
with
ψi(e
S, γ) =
eSi
eSi + e
S
j
γ +
1
2
(1− γ), (11)
e
S =
(
eS1 e
S
2
)
and γ ∈ [0, 1]. 1− γ represents the part of the common pool resource
(T ) which will be destroyed in case of war. Thus, the bargaining norm splits the
surplus which will arise in case of settlement ((1− γ)T ).13 Given that γ = 0, i.e. in
case war destroys the whole resource, the resource is divided in half, irrespectively
13All axiomatic bargaining solutions (such as Nash (1950) and Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975))
in a symmetric environment yield the same outcome. This occurs since T and R are complete
substitutes and preferences are identical. Therefore, the resulting payoff frontier is linear and
has a gradient of −1. All calculations can be found in an appendix, which will be sent to the
reader upon request.
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of the investment in arms. For γ ∈]0, 1[ part of the resource is destroyed in case of
war and for γ = 1 war has no impact on the size of T .
Implementing the bargaining norm and the level of appropriation contingent on
the parameters of the first stage in equation (3) yields the following indirect utility
function:
vi(χ,d, e
S, γ, θ, R, T ) =
[
φii
(
di, a˜j(·), θ
)
ψi(·) + φji
(
dj , a˜i(·), θ
)
ψj(·)
]
T
+R− eSi ,
(12)
with a˜i(·) = a¯i(χ, dj, θ, ψi(eS, γ), T ). The utility maximization problem of the agents
thus becomes
max
di,e
S
i
vi(·)
s.t. aj(·) ≥ 0, di ≥ 0, eSi ≥ 0, eSi ≥ ai(dj) + di,
(13)
which gives us the following Lagrangian function:
Ki(χ, d, eS, γ, µi, R, θ, T ) = vi(·) + µi aj(·) + λi
(
eSi − di − ai(·)
)
, (14)
where µi just represents the non-negativity constraint on the level of appropriation in
equilibrium. We are able to show that the restrictions on eSi and di are never binding
and that λi > 0 in equilibrium, i.e. the corresponding constraint (e
S
i ≥ ai(dj) + di)
is exactly satisfied.14 Therefore, concerning the equilibrium allocation of eSi and di,
we only need to discriminate between an interior and a corner solution with respect
to the investment in appropriation in stage 2. In the interior solution the level of
appropriation is positive (aj(·) > 0), in the corner solution it is zero (aj(·) = 0).
Equation (15a) and (15b) display the FOC in the first stage with respect to the
investment in arms (eSi ) and its allocation to defense (di) if the restriction on aj
(aj ≥ 0) is non-binding, i.e. µi = 0:[
∂ φii(·)
∂ di
+
∂ φii(·)
∂ aj(·)
d aj(·)
d di
]
ψi(·)T =λi, (15a)[
φii(·)
∂ ψi(·)
∂ eSi
+ φji (·)
∂ ψj(·)
∂ eSi
+
∂ φii(·)
∂ aj(·)
∂ aj(·)
∂ ψi(·)
dψi(·)
d eSi
ψi(·)
]
T =1− λi. (15b)
Equation (15a) displays the FOC with respect to the allocation of arms to defensive
actions. The first term in brackets on the LHS of equation (15a) represents the di-
rect effect of di on φ
i
i, which is unambiguously positive. The second term in brackets
represents the effect of a change in the level of appropriation on φii triggered by a
marginal increase in defense (indirect effect of di), which can be either positive or
negative (cf. figure 1). The term on the RHS displays the shadow price of arms. In
equilibrium it represents, as already mentioned, the marginal willingness to pay for
an incremental increase in arms in order to defend the domestic share or to appro-
priate the foreign share of the resource.
14See mathematical appendix.
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Equation (15b) displays the FOC with respect to the investment in arms. The first
two terms in brackets on the LHS represent the direct effect of an increase in eSi on
the defended domestic share (first term) and the appropriated foreign share (second
term), where the former one is unambiguously positive and the latter is unambigu-
ously non-positive.15 The third term in brackets on the LHS of equation (15b)
shows the indirect effect of an incremental increase in eSi on the defended domestic
share. This effect is unambiguously negative since an increase in the domestic share
(T Si ≡ ψi(·)T ) also increases the investment in appropriation of agent j (cf. figure
1). The RHS of equation (15b) represents the opportunity cost of arms, which con-
sists of two parts. The first part simply represents the marginal cost of production
of arms, the second part is the shadow price of arms. As long as λi > 0, the oppor-
tunity costs of arms are below one. This shows the additional benefit which arises
from the fact that each unit of the resource R invested in arms is also a means of
both defending the domestic share and of appropriating the foreign share.
It is easy to verify that these FOCs are symmetric. Thus, e1 = e2 = e and
d1 = d2 = d is a Nash-equilibrium and the symmetric Nash-equilibrium level of
arms and defense are
eS
∗
(χ, γ, θ, T ) =

(
γ+(2−γ)θ χ
)
T
4
for θ ∈
[
0, θ˜
]
,(
−2+θ(1+2χ)(2+γ)−4 γ θ2 χ2
)
T
16 θ2 χ
for θ ∈
]
θ˜, 1
]
,
(16)
d∗(χ, γ, θ, T ) =

(
γ+(2−γ)θ χ
)
T
4
, for θ ∈
[
0, θ˜
]
,(
−2+θ(1+2χ)(2+γ)−4 γ θ2 χ2
)
T
16 θ χ
(
θ(1+2χ)−1
) for θ ∈ ]θ˜, 1] , (17)
with
θ˜ =
1
2χ
.
θ˜ represents the case-separating level of the exogenous effectiveness parameter.16 If
appropriation is sufficiently relatively ineffective (θ ∈ [0, θ˜]), the Nash-equilibrium
level of defense equals the investment in defense just sufficient to deter appropria-
tion. In this case, the investment in defense equals the effort in the bargaining game
(eS
∗
(·) = d∗(·), cf. equations (16) and (17), upper case) showing that the whole
investment in arms is indeed exclusively used for defensive means. Thus, the bar-
gaining norm produces an allocation of the common-pool resource T which remains
uncontested in this case.
If θ ∈]θ˜, 1], the investment in arms (eS∗) is higher than the investment in defense
15Since eSi > 0,
∂ ψi(·)
∂ eS
i
> 0 and
∂ ψj(·)
∂ eS
i
< 0. Moreover, since µi = 0 (i.e. aj(·) ≥ 0) and
di > 0 ⇒ φii ∈]0, 1] and φji ∈ [0, 1].
16For convenience, we are not explicitly display the equilibrium value of the shadow price
(λ∗(χ, γ, θ, T )). As it turns out, λ∗(·) is positive, which proofs that indeed the correspond-
ing constraint is exactly satisfied, i.e. arms are totally exhausted in case of settlement. See
appendix for calculation.
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(d∗). This demonstrates that in this case the level of defense in equilibrium is insuf-
ficient for deterring appropriation (cf. equations (15a) and (15b), lower case), since
the shadow price of an investment in arms is positive, i.e. arms are exhausted in
case of settlement. Hence, the bargaining norm produces an allocation of T which
becomes contested.
We now turn to determine the level of appropriation and the level of claims to
property in equilibrium.
5 The full game
Given the investment in arms (e∗) and their allocation to defensive means (d∗), we
are now able to determine the level of appropriation and the level of security of
property rights in equilibrium:
a∗(χ, γ, θ, T ) =

0, for θ ∈
[
0, θ˜
]
,
T (2 θ χ−1)
(
−2+θ(1+2χ)(2+γ)−4 γ θ2 χ2
)
16 θ2 χ
(
θ(2χ+1)−1
) for θ ∈ ]θ˜, 1] , (18)
and
φii
∗
(χ, γ, θ, T ) =
1 for θ ∈
[
0, θ˜
]
,
1
2 θ χ
, for θ ∈
]
θ˜, 1
]
.
(19)
As already mentioned, in case θ is low enough, appropriation will be endogenously
deterred, due to the investment in defense (a∗(·) = 0, cf. equation (18), upper case).
In this case property rights are perfectly secure (φii(·) = 1, cf. equation (19), upper
case). Thus, a∗(·) and φii∗(·) remain unchanged by a change in θ, as long as θ ≤ θ˜
(see figure 2 and 3). In the case of θ > θ˜, property rights become insecure due to
the positive investment in appropriation (cf. equations (18) and (19), lower case).
Figure 2 shows the investment in arms and the allocation of arms for appropriation
and defense. As long as θ is sufficiently low (θ < θ˜), appropriation is deterred and
e∗(·) = d∗(·) becomes a linear increasing function of θ. At the case-separating level of
the exogenous relative effectiveness parameter (θ˜) appropriation emerges and stays
positive for θ ∈]θ˜, 1]. The investment in arms increases furthermore in the interior
solution until θ = θ˘ if (χ, γ) ∈ ξ, with
θ˘ =
1
(2 + γ)(1 + 2χ)
(20)
and
ξ =
{
(χ, γ)
∣∣∣∣12 < χ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 4χ− 22χ− 1
}
. (21)
In this case the negative impact on the investment in arms due to the decrease in
defense is overcompensated by the positive impact due to the increase in appropri-
ation, as long as θ < θ˘. Nevertheless, a∗ stays below d∗ as long as θ, χ≪ 1. Taking
9
eS
∗
d∗
a∗
θ
1θ˜ θ˘
Figure 2: e∗, d∗ and a∗ contingent on θ for χ = 1
a look at the level of security of claims to property (figure 3) will demonstrate that,
as long as θ ∈ [0, θ˜], perfectly secure property rights emerge in equilibrium. Given
that θ > θ˜, appropriation emerges and with it insecure property rights (φii
∗
< 1).
Thus, the level of security of property rights is a monotonically decreasing function
of θ for θ > θ˜, with φii
∗
min = φ
i
i
∗
∣∣
χ,θ→1
= 1
2
.
The following proposition recapitulates our findings:
Proposition 1 (Contested and uncontested settlement in equilibrium)
1. If the level of the exogenous relative effectiveness parameter is sufficiently low
(θ ∈ [0, θ˜]), the investment in arms equals the level of defense in equilibrium
(eS
∗
= d∗). In this case, appropriation is endogenously deterred (a∗ = 0),
perfectly secure property rights emerge in equilibrium (φii
∗
= 1) and with them
uncontested settlement.
2. If θ ∈]θ˜, 1] the investment in arms exceeds the level of defense (eS∗ > d∗) and
appropriation emerges in equilibrium (a∗ > 0). In this case, property rights
become insecure (φii
∗
< 1), i.e. contested settlement emerges.
We now turn to answering the second question: Does settlement always Pareto
dominate war? Therefore we have to determine the investment in arms and the
payoff in equilibrium under war.
6 War
Equation (22) represents the payoff of both agents in case of war, given a TCSF:
uWi (e
W, R, T ) =
eWi
eWi + e
W
j
γ T +R− eWi , (22)
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θ
1
1
θ˜
1
2
φii
∗
Figure 3: The level of security of property rights (φii
∗
) contingent on θ for χ = 1
with eW =
(
eW1 e
W
2
)
. In case of war both parties compete over the part of the com-
mon pool resource which is not destroyed by war (γ T ), where eW1 and e
W
2 represent
the investment in arms in order to seize the common pool resource. Anticipating
war, both agents try to maximize their payoff, given by (22), over eWi :
max
eWi
uWi (·)
s.t. eWi ≥ 0,
where it is easy to verify that in the symmetric Nash-equilibrium
eW
∗
=
γ T
4
. (23)
Given the investment in arms in case of war (eW
∗
) and the investment in arms and
its allocation to offensive and defensive actions in case of settlement (eS
∗
, a∗ and d∗)
we are now able to compare the payoffs under contested and uncontested settlement
with the payoff under war in equilibrium.
7 War versus Bargaining
The indirect utility function under settlement in equilibrium becomes
vS
∗
(χ, γ, θ, R, T ) = φii
∗
(χ, T )
T
2
+
(
1− φii∗(χ, T )
) T
2
+R− eS∗(χ, γ, θ, T )
⇔ vS∗(·) =

T
2
+R− γ+(2−γ)θ χ
4
T , for θ ∈
[
0, θ˜
]
,
T
(
1−χ+2χ2 θ
)
4χ θ
+R− T
(
−2+θ(1+2χ)(2+γ)−4 γ θ2 χ2
)
16 θ2 χ
for θ ∈
]
θ˜, 1
]
.
(24)
Since the efforts of both agents are identical, T S1 = T
S
2 = ψi(e
S∗ , γ)T = T
2
, i.e.
both agents obtain initial claims to a half of the common pool resource in case of
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settlement. If θ is sufficiently low, the domestic share remains unchallenged (φii
∗
= 1)
since appropriation is deterred (equation (24), upper case). If θ > θ˜ appropriation
emerges and thus φii
∗
< 1 (equation (24), lower case). In either case, the investment
in arms is positive (eS∗(·) > 0).
Under war a part of the common pool resource ((1 − γ)T ) is destroyed. Since
the investment in arms is identical for both agents and arms are exhausted in war,
each agent creates effective property rights to a half of the remaining common pool
resource, i.e. the part which is not destroyed. The payoff under war thus becomes
in equilibrium:
vW
∗
(γ,R, T ) =
γ T
2
+R− eW∗(γ, T ),
⇔ vW∗(γ,R, T ) = R+ γ T
4
.
(25)
Given these results we are now able to compare the payoffs in equilibrium under
settlement and under war. To keep the analysis simple, we assume that χ = 1, i.e. we
assume that appropriation is non-destructive. This is primae facie an ideal condition
to detect settlement rather than war in equilibrium since, even if settlement becomes
contested, any ex post forced redistribution does not involve demolishment of the
resource under consideration. However, comparing vW
∗
with vS
∗
shows, that even
under these circumstances, war delivers a higher payoff in equilibrium than the
payoff under contested and, respectively, uncontested settlement if war is not too
destructive (if γ is not to high):
vW
∗
{
>
≤
}
vS
∗
iff γ, θ ∈
{ A
B
}
, (26)
with
A = {(γ, θ) ∣∣ 0 ≤ θ ≤ θ¯, γ˜ < γ ≤ 1} ,
B = {(γ, θ) ∣∣ 0 ≤ θ ≤ θ¯, 0 ≤ γ ≤ γ˜ ∣∣ θ¯ < θ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1} ,
for
γ˜ =
{
θ−1
θ
2
−1
, for θ ∈
[
0, θ˜
]
,
2
3 θ
+ 8 θ
3
− 2, for θ > θ˜
and θ¯ =
9 +
√
17
16
. (27)
This is graphically represented in figure 4, where the u-shaped curve represents the
continuum of γ/θ-combinations which delivers equal payoff under war and settle-
ment. To the north of this curve we find the γ/θ-combinations which deliver a higher
payoff under war than under settlement (A).
If θ ≤ θ˜, the corner solution applies in the bargaining game (to the west of the dotted
line). Here, the investment in arms in case of settlement (eS
∗
) is strictly monoton-
ically rising in θ, with eS
∗
∣∣
θ→0
→ eW∗ (cf. equation (16), upper case and equation
(23)). Thus, as already mentioned, for θ = 0 the model presented here replicates the
findings of Skaperdas (2006), where appropriation is exogenously foreclosed. Hence,
as long as θ ∈]0, θ˜], the (positive) difference between the investment in arms in case
12
of settlement and in case of war (∆e∗ = eS
∗ − eW∗) is solely owed to the investment
in defense necessary to deter appropriation. The more relative effective appropria-
tion becomes compared to defense (the higher the level of θ), the higher the value
of ∆e∗. Furthermore, if, in addition, γ is sufficiently high, i.e. the costs of war
in terms of destroyed units of the resource under consideration are sufficiently low,
the effect of the additional investment in arms (∆e∗) on the payoff in equilibrium
overcompensates the negative effect due to the destruction of the resource under
consideration.
Therefore, we were able to demonstrate the circumstances under which war Pareto
dominates settlement, or in other words: The social benefit of war.
Moreover, the model presented here comprises the structure of various models used
extensively in contest theory.
γ
1
θ˜ θ¯ 1
θ
B
A
Figure 4: The dominance of war over settlement and v.v. for χ = 1
1. If (γ, θ) ∈ C the model presented here replicates the findings of Skaperdas
(2006), with
C = {(γ, θ) |0 ≤ γ < 1, θ = 0} ,
and C ⊂ B. In this case settlement always Pareto dominates war, since in both
cases (settlement and war) there is an equal investment in arms, but in case
of war, part of the resource is destroyed:
eS
∗
∣∣∣
(γ,θ)∈C
= eW
∗
=
γ T
4
, (28)
vS
∗
∣∣∣
(γ,θ)∈C
=
T (2− γ)
4
+R >
γ T
4
+R = vW
∗
. (29)
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2. If (γ, θ) ∈ D, with
D = {(γ, θ) |γ = 0, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1} , (30)
and D ⊂ B, the model presented here replicates the findings of Grossman
(2001), in his case of initial claims to property, and Grossman and Kim (1995),
where a resource to which two agents have initial claims to property is con-
tested in a two stage game. In this case war is totally destructive, thus the
resource under consideration is divided equally between both agents, irrespec-
tive of their investment in arms.
3. If γ = 1, war is not destructive, thus war always Pareto dominates settlement.
The modell presented here replicates the findings of Grossman (2001) in case
of a common pool resource, if (γ, θ) ∈ E , with
E = {(γ, θ) ∣∣γ = 1, 0 ≤ θ ≤ θ¯} , (31)
with E ⊂ A.
The following proposition recapitulates our findings.
Proposition 2 (Settlement vs. war)
1. If (γ, θ) ∈ A, war Pareto dominates settlement (vW∗ > vS∗). In this case
the level of destructibility (γ) is insufficient to endogenously foreclose war.
2. If (γ, θ) ∈ B, settlement Pareto dominates war (vS∗ > vW∗). In this case
the level of destructibility is sufficient to foreclose war.
3. If (γ, θ) ∈ C, the model presented here replicates the findings of Garfinkel and
Skaperdas (2000) and Skaperdas (2006).
4. If (γ, θ) ∈ D, the model presented here replicates the findings of Grossman
(2001), in his case of initial claims to property, and Grossman and Kim (1995).
5. If (γ, θ) ∈ E , the model presented here replicates the findings of Grossman
(2001) in his case of a common pool resource.
8 Conclusion
Disputes between groups of people, such as states, confronts the parties with a guns-
versus-butter tradeoff, i.e. a tradeoff between the productive and unproductive use
of scarce resources. Given these opportunity costs, we illuminated the terms and
conditions necessary to endogenously preclude the violent settlement of disputes
(war).
To begin with we have shown the exact circumstances under which self-enforcing
property rights (uncontested settlement) arise using a bargaining solution. We found
out that the investment in arms associated with the bargaining procedure is exclu-
sively used in order to defend either side’s initial claims to property - obtained
14
through the agreement - if appropriation is sufficiently relatively ineffective. Ac-
cordingly, we were able to show that the supposed bargaining procedure is able to
convert initial claims to property into effective property rights. However, in contrast
to Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000) and Skaperdas (2006), uncontested settlement ap-
pears not by assumption but in equilibrium: Both agents, given their investment
in arms, independently decide to back-off from appropriation. Moreover, we were
able to determine the exact costs of the endogenous deterrence of appropriation,
i.e. we have found an endogenously determined measure for the transaction costs
underlying an uncontested bargaining solution.
Further, we have shown that, in contrast to Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000) and
Skaperdas (2006), even in a one-period consideration, war may Pareto dominate
settlement. The reason for this is that the investment in arms is always higher in
case of settlement than in case of war, if appropriation is not technologically impos-
sible. This effect emerges since any unit of the uncontestable resource, spent in order
to influence the threadpoint has a further function: It is also a means of defending
the part of the resource under consideration obtained through the bargaining pro-
cedure, and of appropriating the other part of the resource. This partly offsets the
disadvantages of war, namely the destruction of the resource under consideration.
Consequently, if war is not too destructive, settlement always produces a lower pay-
off for both agents in equilibrium than war. Hence, we were able to demonstrate
the social benefit of war.
Thirdly, the model presented here is able to replicate the findings of (i) Skaperdas
(2006) if appropriation is technologically impossible and war is destructive. In this
case, war and settlement exhibit equal investment in arms but war delivers a lower
value of the resource. According to this, even in a one period consideration settle-
ment Pareto dominates war. (ii) If war is absolutely destructive then, according to
the bargaining norm, the resource under consideration is divided in half, irrespec-
tive of the investment in arms by both agents. If appropriation is not exogenously
precluded, then the investment in arms made by the two agents, solely represents
the investment made in order to defend and to appropriate initial claims. On this
account, the model presented here replicates the findings of Grossman (2001) in his
case of initial claims to property and Grossman and Kim (1995). (iii) If war evades
no destruction of the resource under consideration, then the model presented here
replicates the findings of Grossman (2001) in his case of a common pool resource.
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Mathematical Appendix
A Utility Maximization in the First Stage
The utility maximization problem of the agent in stage one becomes
max
di,ei
vi(χ,d, e,γ, θ)
s.t. (i) ei ≥ 0,
(ii) di ≥ 0,
(iii) ei ≥ ai(dj) + di,
(iv) aj(·) ≥ 0,
(32)
with i 6= j. The Lagrangian thus becomes
Ki(·) = vi(χ,d, e, γ, θ) + µi aj(·) + λi(ei − di − ai(·)). (33)
Partial derivation leads to the following Kuhn-Tucker-conditions
∂Ki
∂di
≤ 0, di ≥ 0 and ∂Ki
∂di
di = 0, (34a)
∂Ki
∂ei
≤ 0, ei ≥ 0 and ∂Ki
∂ei
ei = 0, (34b)
∂Ki
∂µi
≥ 0, µi ≥ 0 and ∂Ki
∂µi
µi = 0, (34c)
∂Ki
∂λi
≥ 0, λi ≥ 0 and ∂Ki
∂λi
λi = 0, (34d)
where each third term represents the complementary slackness condition. Since
these conditions are symmetric, we know that e1 = e2 = e and d1 = d2 = d is a
Nash-equilibrium.17
Implementing κi and νi as the shadow price for violating the non-negativity con-
straints on ei and di respectively delivers the modified Lagrangian
K˜i(·) = vi(χ,d, e, γ, θ) + µi aj(·) + λi(ei − di − ai(·)) + κi ei + νi di, (35)
17Therefore also λ1 = λ2 = λ and µ1 = µ2 = µ in equilibrium.
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where partial derivation leads to the following FOCs:
∂K˜i
∂ei
∣∣∣∣
e1=e2, d1=d2, λ1=λ2, µ1=µ2,κ1=κ2, ν1=ν2
= 0, (36a)
⇔
√
2 d T
θ λχ
γ(λ(1 + 2χ) + µχ)
8 e
− T γ χ
4 e
+ λ− 1 + κ = 0, (36a′)
∂K˜i
∂di
∣∣∣∣
e1=e2, d1=d2, λ1=λ2, µ1=µ2, κ1=κ2, ν1=ν2
= 0, (36b)
⇔
√
2 T
d θ λχ
λ+ µχ
4
− µ
θ
− λ+ ν = 0, (36b′)
∂K˜i
∂µi
∣∣∣∣
e1=e2, d1=d2, λ1=λ2, µ1=µ2
= 0, (36c)
⇔
√
d T χ
2 θ λ
− d
θ
= 0, (36c′)
∂K˜i
∂λi
∣∣∣∣
e1=e2, d1=d2, λ1=λ2, µ1=µ2
= 0, (36d)
⇔ e− d−
√
d T χ
2 θ λ
+
d
θ
= 0, (36d′)
For either d = 0 or e = 0, this system of equations is not solvable since the LHS
of either of equation (36a′) or (36b′) would go to infinity. Hence, the restrictions
on ei and di are never binding in the symmetric equilibrium and consequently, the
shadow prices are zero in equilibrium:
κ∗ = 0 ∧ ν∗ = 0. (37)
Moreover, λ 6= 0 in equilibrium, since otherwise the LHS of equations (36a′-36d′)
would go to infinity. Thus, arms are always exhausted, i.e. the sum of efforts raised
in order to defend or appropriate equals the investment in arms.
Given these calculations, we know that there are only two different cases that
need to be examined in equilibrium: In the first case the restriction on ai (ai ≥ 0)
is non-binding, in the second case it binds.
Case ai µi
1. ≥ 0 = 0
2. = 0 ≥ 0
Given, that µ1 = µ2 ≥ 0, the solution to the systems of equations (36a′ - 36d′)
becomes:
eS
∗
(χ, γ, θ, T ) =
(γ + (2− γ)θχ)T
4
, (38a)
17
d∗(χ, γ, θ, T ) =
(γ + (2− γ)θχ)T
4
, (38b)
λ∗(χ, γ, θ, T ) =
2 θ χ
γ + (2− γ) θ χ, (38c)
µ∗(χ, γ, θ, T ) =
2 θ(1− 2 θ χ)
γ + (2− γ) θ χ. (38d)
Given, that µ1 = µ2 = 0, the solution to the systems of equations (36a
′ - 36d′)
becomes:
eS
∗
(χ, γ, θ, T ) =
(− 2 + θ(1 + 2χ)(2 + γ)− 4 γ θ2 χ2)T
16 θ2 χ
, (39a)
d∗(χ, γ, θ, T ) =
(− 2 + θ(1 + 2χ)(2 + γ)− 4 γ θ2 χ2)T
16 θ χ
(
θ(1 + 2χ)− 1) , (39b)
λ∗(χ, γ, θ, T ) =
2(θ(2χ+ 1)− 1)
−2 + θ(1 + 2χ)(2 + γ)− 4 γ θ2 χ2 , (39c)
where it is easy to verify that the corner solution (µ∗1 = µ
∗
2 ≥ 0) applies as long as
θ ≤ 1
2χ
.
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